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BUILDING THE CANON OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LESSONS 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There exists an uneven dialogue between the Utah judiciary and the Utah bar 
on pleading under the Utah Constitution. While the bench encourages legal 
arguments based in the State Constitution,1 members of Utah’s legal community 
have noted challenges to succeeding on state constitutional claims.2 When the bar 
tries to make a constitutional claim, there is little case law on which to base an 
argument,3 and when the Utah Constitution is pleaded, the court will often decide 
on other grounds. 4  The bar should anticipate few cases to support a state 
constitutional proposition. However, in the interest of developing the Utah 
constitutional canon, advocates should not opt for a mere footnote to the one case 
remotely on point or undeveloped arguments relying on nothing more than the 
plain text of the Utah Constitution. Rather, the brief that gives modern and 
historical meaning to the text by using various interpretational tools that have been 
offered by the Utah Supreme Court not only has a good chance of being heard but 
also can push forward new state constitutional doctrine.  
Since the 1970s, the Utah Supreme Court has given meaning to state 
constitutional provisions independent of the interpretations of their federal 
counterparts. This tradition is known as New Judicial Federalism5 and, consistent 
with this tradition, Utah courts have been departing from positions historically 
                                                        
* © 2014 Jordan Dez. Articles Editor, Utah Law Review, J.D. candidate 2015, S.J. 
Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I would like to thank Professor Michael Teter 
and Christopher Stout for their thoughtful feedback and the staff of the Utah Law Review 
for their outstanding work editing this piece.  
1 State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (“Until such time as 
attorneys heed the call of the appellate courts of this state to more fully brief and argue the 
applicability of the state constitution, we cannot meaningfully play our part in the judicial 
laboratory of autonomous state constitutional law development.” (citations omitted)), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2007); Christine 
M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts, UTAH B.J., Nov. 1989, at 
25, 25–27. 
2  Paul Wake, A Precious Birthright or Federal Porridge: Which Should Utah 
Lawyers Choose?, UTAH B.J., Jan./Feb. 2007, at 27, 30 (“Sometimes, the Utah Supreme 
Court has talked a good talk about its willingness to interpret the Utah Constitution, and 
then resorted to the easy lockstep approach in interpreting the state’s constitution.”). 
3 See id. 
4 See, e.g., Weber Cnty. v. Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Utah 2013); State v. 
Hoffmann, 318 P.3d 225, 236–37 (Utah Ct. App. 2013). 
5 Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years after Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation 
and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 175, 176 (1998). 
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interpreted “lockstep”6 with the U.S. Constitution, in favor of a more “primacist”7 
approach. When a state judiciary takes a primacist approach, they first turn to the 
state constitution to provide relief. If relief cannot be provided under the state 
constitution, they will then turn to the U.S. Constitution.8 Conversely, under a 
lockstep approach, the state judiciary will interpret the state constitutional 
provisions to mean the same as their federal counterparts. 9  Under a third 
“interstitial” approach, a court will only turn to the state constitution if relief 
cannot be provided under the U.S. Constitution.10 
One example of a Utah court’s early participation in New Judicial Federalism 
is the public interest standing doctrine, also known as “alternative standing.” In 
Jenkins v. State,11 the Utah Supreme Court introduced the public interest standing 
doctrine into the Utah constitutional dialogue based solely on the respondent’s 
briefing grounded in sister state law.12 Previously, standing had always been a 
question interpreted lockstep with the U.S. Constitution. 13  But as judiciaries, 
including Utah’s, became more willing to depart from lockstep traditions, the stage 
was set for success under arguments based in the Utah Constitution.  
Since the salad days of New Judicial Federalism and Jenkins v. State, the Utah 
constitutional record has developed, as have the tools for interpretation. This Note 
argues that although the current Utah Supreme Court will show more restraint than 
the Jenkins v. State court in adopting new doctrine, these developments have not 
altered the court’s continuing commitment to the primacist approach.14 The Utah 
Supreme Court will hear and rule on arguments based in the text of the Utah 
Constitution when they are developed beyond the plain dictionary meaning. The 
manner in which the court utilized constitutional interpretation to develop the Utah 
public interest standing doctrine and the Utah Supreme Court’s proposed methods 
of constitutional interpretation from American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake15 
                                                        
6 Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 837, 839 & n.2 (2011). 
7 See id. at 837. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. at 839 & n.2. 
10 Id. at 837. 
11 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978). 
12 Id. at 443 (citing State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974)); see 
also Brief for Respondent-Plaintiff at 18–22, Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978) 
(No. 17566) (relying on sister state law and an analogy to a Utah taxpayer standing case to 
argue for a more flexible standing doctrine). 
13 Cf. State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1939) (“This court is committed to the 
rule that an attack on the validity of a statute cannot be made by parties whose interests 
have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute.”). 
14 The Utah Supreme Court is expressly primacist. Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 
140 P.3d 1235, 1239 (Utah 2006); West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006 
(Utah 1994); Wake, supra note 2, at 30; see Sinéad McLoughlin, Comment, Choosing a 
“Primacy” Approach: Chief Justice Christine M. Durham Advocating States Rights in Our 
Federalist System, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1162, 1169–79 (2002). 
15 140 P.3d 1235, 1239–53 (Utah 2006). 
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illuminate the historical developments in the Utah Supreme Court’s approach to 
state constitutional interpretation. Drawing from these developments, this Note 
outlines an approach that, if followed, will help practitioners build a more vigorous 
state constitutional canon as they raise arguments in a manner more likely to be 
well received by Utah courts. With this goal in mind, this Note will proceed as 
follows. 
First, Part II examines the modern history of interpreting the Utah 
Constitution by reviewing the development of the public interest standing doctrine. 
This history frames the current direction of textual interpretation. The doctrine is 
evidence that the Utah Constitution is a vibrant and relevant document. Though it 
shows that the court may be more conservative in its departures from lockstep 
analysis, it is still willing to depart, particularly if the claims are based in well-
substantiated textual arguments.  
Part III, then, discusses what it takes to mount a constitutional argument in the 
Utah courts. Though “plain meaning” textual arguments are sufficient to persuade 
some members of the Utah Supreme Court, 16  the strongest textual arguments 
should be supported with historical context that conveys the intent of the 1895 
Utah voters and drafters of the Utah Constitution—that is, through an analysis of 
the text of the Utah Constitution, the constitutional traditions of sister states, and 
the society that adopted the Utah Constitution.  
 
II.  PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING DOCTRINE AND NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
 
The public interest standing doctrine is consistent with the modern trend of 
state courts developing state constitutional doctrine independent of the federal 
analysis—even in the face of contrary precedent. This trend arguably began in 
1977, when Justice William Brennan penned an article in the Harvard Law Review 
calling upon state courts to look to their own constitutions to protect individual 
liberties in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s conservative approach to these 
protections. 17  State courts responded positively to Justice Brennan’s call, 
beginning a trend referred to as New Judicial Federalism.18  
                                                        
16 Id. at 1264 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). But see State v. Hoffmann, 318 P.3d 225, 
236–37 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (“‘[S]tate constitutional analysis . . . limited to the truism that 
article I, section 14 may provide greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth 
Amendment’ fails to advance an adequate state constitutional analysis. . . . [Plaintiff’s 
brief] does not quote or analyze the constitutional text, which our supreme court has 
consistently held to be the starting point of state constitutional analysis. It does not discuss 
the original understanding of article I, section 14. And it does not discuss historical and 
textual evidence, sister state law, or policy arguments.” (quoting State v. Worwood, 164 
P.3d 397, 405 (Utah 2007))). 
17 JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 24 (2005) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977)); 
see also Milo Steven Marsden, Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State 
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The public interest standing doctrine entered the Utah constitutional dialogue 
in 1978, just a year after the publication of Justice Brennan’s article.19 The doctrine 
expanded the state standing analysis, going against prior precedent that had 
interpreted standing as consistent with the Article III federal analysis. 20  The 
doctrine began as a footnote in Jenkins v. State,21 was then included as dicta in 
Jenkins v. Swan, 22  and was later promoted to an alternative holding in Utah 
Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board23 and City of Grantsville v. 
Redevelopment Agency.24 In 2013, more than thirty years after its initial decision in 
Jenkins v. State, the Utah Supreme Court solidified its public interest standing 
doctrine in Gregory v. Shurtleff.25 The journey, however, from Jenkins v. State to 
Gregory v. Shurtleff tracks the ebb and flow of the Utah court’s participation in 
New Judicial Federalism, revealing a modern court that remains avowedly 
primacist, yet unwilling to make drastic departures from traditional interpretation.  
 
A.  The Doctrine 
 
Lynn Jenkins was a Utah man with a penchant for initiating civil litigation pro 
se. 26  His lawsuits included claims alleging that public school teachers were 
infiltrating the legislature,27 public officials were still practicing law,28 and that he 
was taxed too much because of the large land holdings of local religious 
                                                        
Constitution, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 319, 320 (noting the trend toward state constitutional 
interpretation as a reaction to the more conservative Burger Court). 
18 GARDNER, supra note 17, at 25. 
19 Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978). 
20 See id. at 444 (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Plaintiff] did 
not allege (or show) any direct interest or injury as a basis for commencing this action. In 
my opinion this is fatal.”); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978) (“The general 
rule is applicable that a party having only such interest as the public generally cannot 
maintain an action. In order to pass upon the validity of a statute, the proceeding must be 
initiated by one whose special interest is affected, and it must be a civil or property right 
that is so affected.”); State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1939) (“This court is 
committed to the rule that an attack on the validity of a statute cannot be made by parties 
whose interests have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the 
statute.”). 
21 585 P.2d at 443 & n.3 (citing State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 
1974)). 
22 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). 
23 148 P.3d 960, 972 (Utah 2006). 
24 233 P.3d 461, 467 (Utah 2010). 
25 299 P.3d 1098, 1102–06 (Utah 2013).  
26 See, e.g., Jenkins v. MTGLQ Investors, 218 F. App’x 719, 725 (10th Cir. 2007); 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983); Jenkins v. Finlinson, 607 P.2d 289 (Utah 
1980); Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770 (Utah 1980); Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 
(Utah 1978). 
27 Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d at 443. 
28 Finlinson, 607 P.2d at 290. 
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institutions.29 Surely the framers and founders would expect a good citizen like 
Mr. Jenkins to grind his axe with the proper branch of government; however, 
rather than seek a remedy through the legislature or local government, Mr. Jenkins 
chose the expediency of the judiciary. Though perhaps Mr. Jenkins never got the 
justice he sought, and was eventually enjoined from bringing further suit without 
representation by counsel,30 in parsing through his chaotic briefs to determine if he 
had standing, the Utah Court of Appeals initiated a modern doctrine of state 
constitutional jurisprudence: public interest standing.31  
Under the case and controversy limitation of the U.S. Constitution,32 a party 
that brings suit must suffer individual injury before he or she has standing to file 
suit. 33  However, many state constitutions, including the Utah Constitution, are 
textually different from the U.S. Constitution in that they do not include the “case 
and controversy” language that moors the federal justiciability doctrines.34  
Under the modern Utah public interest standing doctrine, as stated in Gregory, 
if a party does not have “traditional standing,” which is coextensive with Article III 
analysis, a party may gain standing upon showing (1) the appropriate party has 
brought suit, and (2) the dispute raises an issue of significant public importance.35 
A party is an “appropriate party” to bring suit if (1) the party is competent to 
effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing the relevant legal and 
factual questions; (2) the issue is unlikely to be raised if the party is denied 
                                                        
29 See Swan, 675 P.2d at 1153. 
30 MTGLQ Investors, 218 F. App’x at 725 (“Because we find this appeal frivolous and 
Mr. Jenkins’s pattern of litigation activity manifestly abusive, we conclude that filing 
restrictions are necessary.”). 
31 Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d at 443. 
32 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
33 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
34 Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution reads: 
 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial 
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts 
as the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district 
court, and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. 
Courts not of record shall also be established by statute.  
 
Article VIII, section 3 of the Utah Constitution reads: 
 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all 
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs 
and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
 
35 Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Utah 2013) (citing Utah Chapter of 
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 972–73 (Utah 2006)). 
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standing; and (3) the issue is not more appropriately addressed by another branch 
of government.36  
 
B.  Departing from a Lockstep Past 
 
When attempting to argue under the Utah Constitution, there may be no 
precedent on which to base an argument, or the available case law may have 
historically interpreted the Utah Constitution lockstep with the U.S. Constitution.37 
However, the development of the public interest standing doctrine shows that the 
court is willing to depart from stare decisis if such an interpretation would conflict 
with a “correct” reading of the Constitution and further exemplifies the inherent 
challenges for the judiciary associated with the delicate balance between upsetting 
once settled law and providing independent meaning to the Utah Constitution.  
Jenkins v. State was a departure from stare decisis. Prior to Jenkins v. State, 
Utah courts had interpreted standing lockstep with the federal analysis. After 
Jenkins v. State, the Utah Supreme Court adhered to the precedent created in that 
case. However, there is a back and forth, as seen in Utah Transit Authority v. Local 
382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union38 and Gregory, that shows evidence of a 
court that is willing to depart from stare decisis when adherence to old doctrine 
would lead to an “incorrect” interpretation. While Utah Transit Authority refused 
to extend the public interest standing doctrine and attempted to entirely repudiate 
the doctrine,39 the Gregory court, in turn, refused to follow the precedent in Utah 
Transit Authority, and limited that case to a mootness distinction.40 
In Utah Transit Authority, the UTA brought an action against the transit union 
stemming from failed collective bargaining negotiations.41 Before the case reached 
the Utah Supreme Court, the parties negotiated an agreement but still sought 
review of the case to guide them in future negotiations.42 Both parties argued for 
an exception to the traditional mootness doctrine under a public interest 
exception. 43 The court refused to extend the exception to mootness and, in so 
doing, held the public interest standing doctrine to be unconstitutional.44 The tools 
                                                        
36 Id. at 1109–10 (citing Sierra Club, 148 P.3d at 972). The requirement of “the most 
appropriate party” became “an appropriate party” in Cedar Mountain Environmental, Inc. 
v. Tooele County ex rel. Tooele County Commission, 214 P.3d 95, 98 (2009). 
37 See GARDNER, supra note 17, at 49 (noting that when state courts attempt to 
interpret their own constitutions there may be no precedent on which to rely). 
38 289 P.3d 582 (Utah 2012). 
39 Id. at 590. 
40 Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1119 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
Gregory dissent relied on the reasoning in Utah Transit Authority, and encouraged the 
court to “repudiate our prior dicta” on public interest standing. See also id. at 1119–21. 
41 Utah Transit Auth., 289 P.3d at 584. 
42 Id. at 585. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 590; see also Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1121–22 (“[T]he power we wield must be 
‘judicial,’ we are foreclosed from making law or announcing our views in an advisory or 
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of interpretation used were the text of the Constitution, history from the 
Constitutional Convention, an inquiry into the processes of other states, and 
judicial traditions in Utah. 
Justice Lee’s dissent in Gregory follows the “model” set forth in Utah Transit 
Authority.45 Justice Lee argued that standing is a constitutional requirement under 
the judicial power clause of the Utah Constitution, which reads that “[t]he judicial 
power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court.”46 Justice Lee used the 
history and intent of the framers to define the scope of judicial power. 47 
Furthermore, Justice Lee contended that under the traditional standing analysis, the 
Gregory appellants did not have standing on either of their claims.48 The dialogue 
between the Gregory dissent and majority evidences the tension between departing 
from stare decisis and giving new independent significance to state constitutional 
provisions. While the Gregory majority adheres to precedent that has been 
developed over a thirty-year period, the dissent builds on the precedent of Utah 
Transit Authority. All of these modern interpretations both adhere to some 
precedent, and depart from other precedent, all in search of the correct 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, the role of stare decisis in state constitutional interpretation may 
not be as strong as in other legal contexts.49 The basic issue in this endeavor is 
whether the legitimacy of judicial review is threatened more by following a 
questionable precedent or by completely abandoning precedent in favor of a 
principle consistent with state constitutional interpretation. In his discussion of the 
role of precedent in constitutional interpretation, Justice Jack Landau of the 
Oregon Supreme Court notes that the process of giving independent significance to 
state constitutional provisions will often be offensive to stare decisis because it 
requires departing from prior holdings that assume the state and federal 
constitutions should be interpreted similarly.50  
Still, a balance must be struck between rejection of incorrect interpretations 
and judicial restraint. Professor Michael Paulsen argues that stare decisis is 
contrary to an originalist reading of a constitution.51 Even in the case where an 
interpretive theory gives a prior judiciary’s interpretation the status of 
constitutional meaning, by the same logic, the current judiciary, tasked with 
interpreting the meaning of the law and constitution, should have complete power 
                                                        
other non-judicial posture. . . . [O]ur exercise of the judicial power must be in the context 
of the issuance of ‘writs’ or in our resolution of ‘cases,’ a formulation that implies a 
particular form for exercising the judicial power.” (citations omitted)). 
45 Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1120. 
46 UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
47 Utah Transit Auth., 289 P.3d at 587. 
48 Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1132. 
49 Landau, supra note 6, at 838. 
50 Id. at 867. 
51 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 
22 CONST. COMMENT 289, 292 (2005). 
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to overturn prior precedent.52 As such, Professor Paulsen asks the question, “Why 
last year’s judge and not this year’s judge?”53  
Though these commentaries are directed at federal constitutional 
interpretation, the criticisms gain even more traction in the state context where 
judiciaries are moving away from a lockstep approach and toward giving state 
constitutions independent significance, and the corpus of case law is in its nascent 
stage.54 In the case of public interest standing, although the expressly primacist 
Utah Supreme Court 55  has been willing to depart from prior precedent, the 
departure is gradual and cautious. Under the public interest standing doctrine, only 
when “traditional” standing does not permit a plaintiff to litigate her claim will the 
court then look for alternative standing. 56  The dual nature of the doctrine—
traditional analysis followed by alternative analysis—is distinct from the standing 
doctrines of other states and may signal the current court’s reticence to make 
drastic departures from a lockstep doctrine. Alternative standing creates an 
interesting paradox of state constitutional interpretation—it is primacist, meaning 
that the court starts with the Utah constitutional doctrine of “traditional” standing, 
but Utah’s traditional standing is the same as the federal standing doctrine. In a 
sense, this doctrine is interstitial—alternative standing will only be an option when 
standing is not granted under a traditional analysis. This doctrine evinces a court 
that is not brazen in its New Judicial Federalism but will gradually incorporate a 
new doctrine with a counterbalance of judicial restraint. 
The history of the public interest standing doctrine reflects a more cautious 
shift in the Utah courts’ state constitutional jurisprudence. The doctrine first 
emerged in Jenkins v. State, where the court provided no explanation or 
justification for the doctrine, just a citation to a New Mexico case: “Appellants cite 
the usual rule that one must be personally adversely affected before he has 
standing to prosecute an action. While such is true, it is also true this Court may 
grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal impact are 
concerned.”57 The concurrence in Jenkins v. State went into slightly more detail to 
justify the doctrine.58 The justification provided by Justice Crocket was essentially 
                                                        
52 E.g., Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983) (“[T]he inherent role of the 
judiciary [is] to interpret constitutional provisions.”). 
53 Paulsen, supra note 51, at 292 (emphasis removed). 
54 Landau, supra note 6, at 867, 869–70 (“The argument that precedent must give way 
to a correct interpretation of a constitution presupposes that an obviously ‘correct’ 
interpretation exists. I have no doubt that, in many cases, that is precisely the case. And, in 
such cases, if it can be shown that prior cases cannot be reconciled with the wording of the 
constitution properly considered in its context and in light of applicable rules of 
construction, the prior cases should be abandoned.”). 
55 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
56 Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1103 (Utah 2013) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983)). 
57 Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (citing State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 
524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974)).  
58 See id. (Crockett, J., concurring).  
2014] BUILDING THE CANON 1119 
based in efficiency: “to avoid delays and minimize the time, effort and expense of 
further litigation.”59  
In his book on interpreting state constitutions, Professor James Gardner 
comments that opinions of this era were often “surprisingly perfunctory and 
contain[ed] little actual analysis or argument.”60 Professor Gardner also notes that 
the history of state constitutional drafting “has proceeded mainly through a process 
of borrowing, swapping, and copying from somebody else’s constitution.”61 The 
origins of the public interest standing doctrine hail from this approach—
“borrowing” from a New Mexico doctrine, with “surprisingly” little analysis.62  
Looking to sister state traditions persists as a viable tool to support a textual 
argument,63 but it may not be given as much weight by the 2014 court as it was in 
Jenkins v. State. The Utah Transit Authority court looked to sister state 
constitutional law to justify Utah interpretations but used this tool in tandem with 
others. 64  In that case, the court noted that many other states have adopted 
constitutional provisions to allow for advisory opinions from the bench.65 Utah 
was in good company with other states who had prohibited advisory opinions.66 
The Utah Transit Authority court found this to support the proposition that Utah 
was in the no-advisory-opinions camp, which was largely based on the framers’ 
statements during the debate of the Constitutional Convention that indicated they 
disapproved of the judiciary making advisory opinions.67 
 
C.  The Restrained Judicial Federalism 
 
Five years after the Jenkins v. State opinion, the court pulled back from its 
broad holding, changing the scope of the doctrine and its use of constitutional 
interpretation. In Jenkins v. Swan, the constitutional arguments for the public 
interest standing test were further elaborated and the doctrine subsequently limited. 
Justice Durham, writing for the court, begins her interpretation with the text of the 
                                                        
59 Id. Though the Utah Supreme Court has used policy justifications for constitutional 
interpretation in the past, see, e.g., Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 
916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993), this approach has since been limited by the Court to being 
employed only to discern intent of the founders and electorate, Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt 
Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1240 & n. 3 (Utah 2006). 
60 GARDNER, supra note 17, at 36. 
61 Id. at 6. 
62 Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d at 443 (citing Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975). 
63 See, e.g., Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1285 (Nehring, J., dissenting) (“By 1895, Utah’s 
debate over the wording of a criminal libel component of its constitution was a common, 
perhaps obligatory, item on the agenda of state constitutional conventions. A canvass of the 
constitutions of the fifty states shows that thirty-four expressly address criminal libel.”). 
64 See Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 289 P.3d 
582, 587–88 (Utah 2012). 
65 Id. at 587. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. at 587. 
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judicial power clause but then goes on to restrain the doctrine based on the 
traditions of the federal and state judiciaries: 
 
Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is 
not constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United 
States Constitution requiring “cases” and “controversies,” since no 
similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution. We previously have 
held that “this Court may grant standing where matters of great public 
interest and societal impact are concerned.” Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585 
P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (footnote omitted). However, the requirement that 
the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal dispute is 
rooted in the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary in Utah.68 
 
The above interpretation is first based in a textual difference—the lack of the 
“case and controversy” language in article XIII of the Utah Constitution. Justice 
Durham relies on the precedent from Jenkins v. State but then looks to the 
historical traditions of the Utah judiciary to restrain the doctrine. Interestingly, the 
citation to the New Mexico case is omitted from the analysis, perhaps to draw 
attention away from the “sister state” nature of that interpretational tool. Also, in 
developing her arguments for the history and tradition of judicial power, Justice 
Durham looks to the mainstays of the federal standing analysis on injury to justify 
the court’s restriction of the doctrine.69 
Both the Jenkins v. Swan majority and, later, the Gregory dissent examine the 
historical understanding of “judicial power” to pull back from the broad holding in 
Jenkins v. State.70 This analysis led the Gregory dissent to conclude that public 
interest standing is unconstitutional and the Jenkins v. Swan majority to limit the 
doctrine to an “alternative” standing—turning to it when “traditional” standing is 
not available or when there is an “interested party.”71 
The alternative standing doctrine in Utah is distinct from other states that have 
seized the textual lack of case and controversy to broaden their standing doctrine. 
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court in Lansing Schools Educational 
Association v. Lansing Board of Education72 chose to reject its prior interpretation 
of standing as lockstep with the federal standing test in favor of a historical 
precedent that allowed for public interest standing.73 In reaching its conclusion in 
                                                        
68 Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). 
69 Id. at 1148–50. 
70 Id. at 1149–51; Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1122 (Utah 2013) (Lee, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
71 Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1121–22 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149–51. 
72 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010). 
73 See id. at 686–700; see also Kenneth Charette, Standing Alone?: The Michigan 
Supreme Court, the Lansing Decision, and the Liberalization of the Standing Doctrine, 116 
PENN ST. L. REV. 199, 203, 206 (2011) (noting the Lansing court “held that in order to 
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Lansing, the Michigan Court overruled Lee v. Macomb County Board of 
Commissioners. 74  The Lee court had interpreted the relevant Michigan 
constitutional provisions on standing lockstep with the federal test.75 In contrast, 
under the Lansing test, a plaintiff has standing to bring a suit if either (1) he or she 
has a specific legal cause of action, or (2) the trial court, in its discretion, believes 
the plaintiff to have standing for some other reason.76 In so holding, the Michigan 
court did not even address its early nineteenth century standing jurisprudence that 
had limited the jurisdictional reach to deciding cases and controversies, foregoing a 
“historical” analysis of its centuries’ old lockstep tradition.77  
Michigan and Utah courts’ standing approach may reflect differences in 
constitutional allotment of power. By constitutional amendment, the Michigan 
judiciary can make advisory opinions, whereas in Utah the framers expressly 
withheld this power from the Utah judiciary.78 Whatever the reason, although the 
Utah Supreme Court is willing to depart from stare decisis, it seems more inclined 
to do so at a gradual pace. The court will not make revolutions in its departure 
from precedent. It will instead ground its decisions in the traditions of the 
judiciary. The move away from precedent, however, can be done while wielding 
the interpretational tools that have been developed over the past thirty years. 
Although Utah’s standing analysis is not entirely distinct from its federal 
counterpart, it is evidence that the Utah judiciary will look to the Utah Constitution 
to provide relief. More importantly, the Utah judiciary is willing to depart from a 
historical lockstep analysis if prior precedent is contrary to a textual reading of the 
Utah Constitution.  
 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE UTAH SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
In order to succeed on Utah constitutional claims, it is essential to first turn to 
the guidance provided by the Utah Supreme Court. In American Bush v. City of 
South Salt Lake, Utah’s teaching case79 on state constitutional interpretation, Chief 
                                                        
adhere to its historical precedent, it was necessary to abandon the federal test for standing 
and return to a set of prudential considerations”). 
74 Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 699. 
75 Lee v. Macomb Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907–08 (Mich. 2001), 
overruled by Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 
2010). 
76 Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 699. 
77 Id. 
78 Justice Lee looked to the history of the Constitutional Convention in Utah Transit 
Authority to support the position that the Utah Constitution does not grant the judiciary the 
power to make advisory opinions. Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated 
Transit Union, 289 P.3d 582, 587 (Utah 2012). 
79  “In many states, there are opinions, ‘teaching cases,’ that set forth a general 
approach to state constitutional interpretation, together with a number of specific rules.” 
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Justice Durham, Justice Parrish, Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring all wrote 
separate opinions outlining their individual approaches to interpreting the text of 
the Utah Constitution.80 Justice Lee had not yet joined the court at the time of 
American Bush,81 but shared his views on Utah constitutional interpretation in the 
majority opinion that he authored in Utah Transit Authority82 and in his dissent in 
Gregory.83 
In American Bush, after losing in federal court, the owners of nude dancing 
establishments and lingerie shops challenged a city zoning ordinance on state 
constitutional grounds under article I protections of free speech and takings.84 The 
justices took the time to address “the poverty of [] Utah case law” concerning the 
Utah Constitution by elaborating their individual approaches to state constitutional 
interpretation. 85  The American Bush court was required “to grapple with the 
difficult questions permeating the debate as to the proper method to follow when 
interpreting our state constitution.” 86  The four opinions in the American Bush 
decision give sophisticated analysis of the interplay between a plain meaning 
analysis of text and a textual analysis that is informed by the historical evidence of 
the intent of the drafters and voters who ratified the Constitution.  
Although Chief Justice Durham’s dissent and concurrence applied a plain 
meaning analysis to article I of the Utah Constitution, 87 the majority took the 
approach that plain meaning must be informed by historical context.88 Through an 
inquiry into the text itself, the state of the law on a national level—which is 
primarily an examination of sister state traditions, and an analysis of the legal 
traditions of Utah in 1895, the meaning intended by the voters and drafters of the 
Constitution can be divined. Though flexibility may bring into question the 
legitimacy of historical interpretation, it may also be a strong tool when advocating 
for a particular interpretation of the Utah Constitution. The history of voters’ 
intentions was determinative in American Bush and boiled down to nude dancing 
not being included in the public imagination of speech at the time of the 
                                                        
Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions as Unique 
Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 193 (2002). 
80 See Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1237, 1254, 1264, 1280 
(Utah 2006). For another developed analysis of each of the American Bush opinions, see 
Evelyn J. Furse, The Successful Creation of a Platform for Debate: Utah Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham’s Legacy Embodied in American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 75 
ALB. L. REV. 1643 (2012). 
81 Judges Biographies, UTAH COURTS, http://www.utcourts.gov/judgesbios/showGalle 
ry.asp?dist=10&ct_type=S, archived at http://perma.cc/MT7Z-AGM9 (last visited June 26, 
2014). 
82 See 289 P.3d at 586–90. 
83 See 299 P.3d 1098, 1118–27 (Utah 2013). 
84 Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1238–39; UTAH CONST. art. 1 §§ 1, 7, 15. 
85 Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1239. 
86 Id. at 1255 (Durrant, J., concurring). 
87 Id. at 1260. 
88 Id. at 1239. 
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ratification.89 In the absence of a rich constitutional record, such arguments can be 
influential in bringing a successful challenge under the Utah Constitution.  
 
A.  The Complications of Plain Meaning Analysis 
 
In American Bush, Chief Justice Durham took a plain meaning approach to 
textual interpretation. 90  Under this approach, “[o]nly if the textual language is 
ambiguous or unclear should we look outside the words to external sources.” 91 
Under the established Utah doctrine of the plain meaning approach, the words of 
the Constitution must be given their “commonly understood meaning” if the text is 
not ambiguous.92 For example, the majority of the court in Utah School Boards 
Association v. Utah State Board of Education93 took the plain meaning approach to 
interpreting the text of article X but looked to case law and legislative history 
following on the heels of the ratification of the Constitution to divine that plain 
meaning.94 
Chief Justice Durham’s plain meaning analysis in American Bush, however, 
looked more to a modern plain meaning to determine the use of the word 
“communicate” in article I of the Utah Constitution.95 Chief Justice Durham cited 
to a 1995 edition of Webster’s Dictionary and also the comparison of the text with 
the language of the U.S. Constitution to determine the plain meaning of the word.96 
Justice Durrant, however, eschewed this particular approach to plain meaning 
interpretation in his concurrence.97 He wrote that there are three approaches to the 
text of the Constitution: (1) the contemporary-context approach, (2) the subjective 
approach, and (3) the historical approach: 
 
All three of these approaches ask the question “what does the 
provision mean?” The contemporary-context approach asks “what should 
the provision mean in the context of our modern values and attitudes?” 
The subjective approach asks “what should the provision mean according 
to the interpreting judge’s own personal values and attitudes?” The 
historical approach asks “what did this provision mean to those who 
drafted and ratified it?” While the answer to the first two questions 
would seem to be a moving target, the answer to the last one, at least in 
                                                        
89 Id. at 1254.  
90 Id. at 1264 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
91 Id. at 1266. 
92 Utah Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 17 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Utah 2001) 
(quoting State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1996)). 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 1241–42. 
95 Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1266–67 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1255–56 (Durrant, J., concurring). 
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theory, is fixed. . . . I believe that the appropriate question is the last 
one.98 
 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Parrish, also takes the historical 
approach to plain meaning. For the majority, plain meaning must necessarily be 
informed by historical context.99 Additionally, a plain meaning argument will not 
stand up on a meaning derived from the modern dictionary. Rather, advocates must 
prove that the meaning was plain to the drafters and voters of the Utah Constitution 
in 1895. 
 
B.  Historical Evidence of Intent 
 
The American Bush majority put forward three steps to a contextual analysis 
of the Utah Constitution that will ultimately inform an interpretation of the intent 
of the drafters of the Constitution and the ratifying public: (1) analyze the text; (2) 
support the analysis with historical evidence of the state of the law when the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified; and (3) provide further context for a textual 
interpretation with Utah’s particular legal traditions at the time of drafting, both 
common law and statutory.100 
 
1.  The Text 
 
Justice Parrish first looked to the text of the Utah Constitution as the “surest 
indication of the intent of its framers and the citizens of Utah who voted it into 
effect.”101 The majority reached the conclusion that article I, sections 1 and 15 
were complementary provisions that should be read together. 102  To reach this 
                                                        
98 Id. at 1256. 
99 Id. at 1239 (majority opinion) (“While we first look to the text’s plain meaning, we 
recognize that constitutional ‘language . . . is to be read not as barren words found in a 
dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those 
who employed them.’ We thus inform our textual interpretation with historical evidence of 
the framers’ intent.” (citations omitted)).  
100 Id. at 1240. Justice Parrish patently rejected previous approaches to constitutional 
interpretation that considered policy arguments. Id. at 1240 n.3 (“We have intentionally 
excluded the consideration of policy arguments suggested by Society of Separationists v. 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993).”).  
101 Id. at 1241. 
102 Id. at 1241–42 (“The framers of the Utah Constitution divided the freedom of 
speech guarantees into three distinct clauses. The first clause (the ‘liberty and responsibility 
clause’), contained in section 1 of the declaration of rights, defines the scope of the 
freedom of speech. Id. art. I, § 1. The second clause (the ‘governmental restriction clause’), 
contained in the first sentence of section 15, prohibits governmental actions that abridge or 
restrain those rights. Id. art. I, § 15. These first two clauses of general application function 
in concert; the first defines what is protected, while the second defines the limits of 
governmental action in relation to those protected activities. The third clause (the ‘criminal 
libel clause’), contained in the second sentence of section 15, illustrates the limits of 
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conclusion, Justice Parrish applied the “conventional method[] of constitutional 
interpretation” that reads other provisions dealing with the same topic to determine 
the meaning of a textual provision.103 Like Chief Justice Durham, Justice Parrish 
also compared the text of the Utah Constitution to the U.S. Constitution, noting the 
lack of specific language in the latter. 104  After determining that the different 
constitutional provisions on speech are to be read together, Justice Parrish looked 
to the constitutional traditions of sister states in 1895 to discern the meaning of 
substantive provisions. 
 
2.  Sister State Constitutional Traditions 
 
Appellant, American Bush, argued that article I of the Utah Constitution 
provided more protection for speech than the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.105 In judging this proposition, Justice Parrish situated Utah within the 
history of speech clauses in sister states around the nation. She noted two distinct 
trends in state constitutional speech clauses. The first is from the colonies 
immediately after the Revolutionary War. At that time, states were basing their 
speech provisions on a series of letters by Trenchard and Gordon known as Cato’s 
Letters, “that argued for more extensive rights of expression without fear of 
government reprisal.”106 The Utah speech clauses are not so expansive, however, 
for they contain language limiting speech by making individuals “responsible for 
the abuse” of the right. 107 The majority noted that this language derives from 
William Blackstone, whose philosophy on the press advocated for no restraint of 
publication but did provide punishment for abuses of liberty.108 This argument is 
reinforced by a citation to a California case that is contemporaneous to the 
ratification of the Utah Constitution that attributes California’s similar 
constitutional language to Blackstone.109 This deep look into the state of the law in 
1895 led the majority to the general conclusion that Utah’s protection for speech is 
not necessarily more expansive than its federal counterpart because it contains 
limiting language that is not present in the U.S. Constitution.110 
In contrast, in his dissent, Justice Nehring looked to the history of the press at 
the time of the Constitutional Convention, as well as the tradition of sister states 
and concluded that “[b]y 1895, Utah’s debate over the wording of a criminal libel 
component of its constitution was a common, perhaps obligatory, item on the 
                                                        
governmental action, and by inference the scope of individual freedoms, in the specific 
instance of criminal libel prosecutions.”).  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1242–43. 
105 Id. at 1238–39. 
106 Id. at 1246. 
107 Id. at 1247. 
108 Id. at 1245. 
109 Id. at 1248 n.13. 
110 See id. at 1248. 
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agenda of state constitutional conventions,” and did not signify a commitment to a 
Blackstonian constitutional agenda.111  
In addition to using sister state constitutions to contextualize the intent of the 
framers in 1895, sister state constitutional jurisprudence is also called upon when 
those courts interpret constitutional language similar to that of Utah. Justice Parrish 
cited Colorado, Indiana, and Tennessee case law that applied a similar textual 
approach to constitutional language similar to that of Utah and concluded that their 
states’ constitutions did not protect obscenity. 112  Conversely, Chief Justice 
Durham’s opinion cited to a modern case from Oregon that interpreted a speech 
clause similar to Utah’s to protect speech similar to that present in American 
Bush.113 Though looking to sister state interpretations does not lead to absolute 
results in textual interpretation, it does provide advocates with forty-nine different 
possible arguments to support a proposition. 
 
3.  Historical Context of the Ratifying Society 
 
(a)  Voters’ Intentions 
 
Unlike the federal constitution, the electorate, not the drafters, ratified state 
constitutions.114 Therefore, in construing state constitutions, courts may look to the 
intention of the drafters and, more importantly, to the intentions of the voters115:  
 
Through the process of voting for the constitution on November 5, 
1895, the citizens of Utah circumscribed the limits beyond which their 
elected officials may not tread. As ‘[a]ll political power is inherent in the 
people,’ Utah Const. art. I, § 2, only Utah’s citizens themselves had the 
right to limit their own sovereign power to act through their elected 
officials. Judicial officers may not substitute their own wisdom for that 
of the people of Utah inasmuch as the citizens limited the actions of their 
elected officials in certain areas but left them free in other areas to 
exercise their judgment in representing their constituents. To do so 
would be to deny political powers to the citizens of Utah that they in 
their wisdom and judgment had retained for themselves.116 
 
                                                        
111 Id. at 1285 (Nehring, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 1252 (majority opinion). 
113 Id. at 1274 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
114 Williams, supra note 79, at 194–96. 
115 Landau, supra note 6, at 862–63 (“The authoritative character of state constitutions 
derives from their adoption by a vote of the people, not from the views of their drafters. 
Thus, it should be the views of the voters who adopted state constitutions that should be the 
focus of the interpretation of those documents. Evidence about what framers or drafters had 
in mind might be relevant; the framers were themselves voters, and their views might have 
been available to voters.” (citations omitted)). 
116 Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1241 (citations omitted). 
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This is the driving force of Justice Parrish’s opinion in American Bush. The court 
ultimately concluded that in light of the clear disapproval the people of Utah had 
for nude dancing at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, nude dancing 
was not a form of expressive communication that the electorate intended to protect 
by means of article I of the Utah Constitution.117  
Though it is often difficult to generalize what the entire group of voters is 
thinking when they ratify a constitution,118 the common law and statutes of 1895 
provide “the clearest picture” of the intentions of the drafters and voters of the 
time. 119  Justice Parrish cited to a statute that was enacted shortly after the 
Constitution was ratified that made “it a crime to ‘employ any female to dance, 
promenade, or otherwise exhibit herself’ in any ‘saloon, dance cellar, or dance 
room, public garden, public highway, or in any place whatsoever, theatres 
excepted,’ or for a female to engage in such activity.” 120 Thus, the legislature 
elected by the ratifying public reaffirmed that it was within their power to prohibit 
nudity.121 In light of this evidence, the majority concluded that article I of the Utah 
Constitution was not intended to protect nude dancing.122 
 
(b)  The Utah Constitutional Convention 
 
When interpreting the Utah Constitution, the justices rely on the record from 
Utah’s Constitutional Convention to varying degrees. For example, Justice Parrish 
considered the Constitutional Convention to be one source for identifying the 
meaning of constitutional provisions in American Bush.123 But, she also noted that 
the record of discussion and vote counts did not convey the mindset of all the men 
that voted.124 Specifically, Justice Parrish examined the debate and votes on two 
amendments that were proposed and rejected during the Convention.125 The first 
proposed amendment she reviewed exemplified one of the weaknesses of 
reviewing the convention record, namely the frequent problem that vote counts and 
competing floor statements can be interpreted to support multiple conflicting 
                                                        
117 Id. at 1254. 
118  These arguments do not always apply with equal force in the case of state 
constitutional interpretation because of the rich record of recent amendments and recorded 
intentions of the framers. Landau, supra note 6, at 862. For a good explanation of the 
history of the Utah Constitutional Convention and ratification process, see generally JEAN 
BICKMORE WHITE, CHARTER FOR STATEHOOD: THE STORY OF UTAH’S STATE 
CONSTITUTION (1996); see also Paul Wake, Fundamental Principles, Individual Rights, 
and Free Government: Do Utahns Remember How to Be Free?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 661, 
662. 
119 Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1250. 
120 Id. at 1252 (citing Utah Rev. Stat. § 4244 (1898)). 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 See id. at 1248–50. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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conclusions.126 The second proposed amendment was more susceptible to a single 
interpretation, but while Justice Parrish found it helpful in the analysis, it was by 
no means the main thrust of her opinion.127 
For Justice Lee, the intent of the drafters is central to the state constitutional 
inquiry. And to identify intent, Justice Lee turned to the Utah Constitutional 
Convention in his majority opinion in Utah Transit Authority: 
 
During the course of the state’s constitutional convention, delegate 
Thomas Maloney proposed an amendment to article VIII that would have 
expressly authorized the Utah Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions 
when requested by the governor or legislature. When questioned why he 
would propose such a clause, Maloney responded that it had “worked 
well” in other states (including Massachusetts, Maine, and Colorado) and 
that the legislature “may want an opinion” on matters of significance. 
Two other delegates voiced their objection to the proposed amendment, 
however, and it was roundly rejected by the body of the convention.128 
 
Based on these statements, Justice Lee later argued in his Gregory dissent that a 
constitutional amendment would be necessary to create the public interest standing 
doctrine.129  
By contrast, Justice Durham’s majority opinion in Gregory did not address 
the framers’ intentions,130 nor did the historical cases that developed the public 
interest standing doctrine use this interpretational tool. 131  The Gregory court 
instead responded: 
 
At the state level, the recognition of an alternative form of standing is 
simply not the type of jurisprudential development which is predicated 
on explicit constitutional authorization. The dissent suggests that this 
                                                        
126 Id. at 1248–49 
127 Id. at 1250. 
128 Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 289 P.3d 582, 
587 (Utah 2012) (citations omitted). 
129 Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1121 (Utah 2013). 
130 In response to the dissent’s argument that the framers explicitly withheld the 
authority to issue advisory opinions, thus not intending public interest standing, Justice 
Durham responded for the majority with arguments grounded in sister state law:  
 
We . . . align with the courts of numerous other states in determining that the 
lack of a ‘‘case or controversy’’ requirement in our state constitution permits the 
development of alternative, public-interest standing doctrines. 
 
E.g. id. at 1105 n.9. 
131 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983).  
2014] BUILDING THE CANON 1129 
court requires explicit textual authorization to articulate the scope of the 
judicial power to assess standing. We reject this view.132 
 
If intent can be surmised from the records of the Constitutional Convention, such 
intent would be helpful to an argument, but by no means necessary. 
 
(c)  Jurisprudential Philosophy 
 
Although Justice Parrish does not give much weight to the “discussion” of the 
Constitutional Convention, the legal treatises that are referenced in the 
Constitutional Convention are cited throughout American Bush. 133  Particularly, 
Justice Nehring and Justice Parrish cite passages from Thomas Cooley to support 
the proposition that the Constitution is derived from natural law, or that the rights 
and powers of the Constitution existed before the document was created. 
 
[A state constitution] is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin 
of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of 
government; it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and 
political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of 
their power, the instrument of their convenience.134 
 
Justice Nehring inquires into the jurisprudential philosophies of the drafters to 
determine their intent.135 Unlike the majority, Justice Nehring determines that the 
philosophy behind article I, section 15 of the Constitution and article I, section 1 
was not Blackstonian. Rather, Justice Nehring capitalizes on the Thomas Cooley 
reference to a natural rights approach throughout the speech clauses: 
 
I reach my conclusion, therefore, that the text and history of article 
I, section 1 and article I, section 15 manifest the intention of the framers 
to protect the expansive rights of expression inherent to every person, 
independent of governmental intrusions justified by Blackstonian 
philosophy or by extrapolation from the criminal libel provisions of 
article I, section 15. I am therefore convinced that the majority is wrong 
in concluding that the men who drafted and ratified the Utah Constitution 
intended the “responsibility for abuse” provision to empower the 
government to restrict “immoral” speech.136 
 
                                                        
132 Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1105 n.9. 
133 See, e.g., Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1240–41 (Utah 2006). 
134 Id. at 1240 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION 36–37 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1972) (1868)). 
135 Id. at 1282–83 (Nehring, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 1287. 
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From Justice Nehring’s interpretation, as well as the majority’s Blackstonian 
interpretation, we see that arguing the jurisprudential philosophies may also gain 
traction at the Utah Supreme Court. Like the play between voters’ intention and 
drafters’ intention, there is room here for advocates to move.  
Also illuminating from Justice Nehring is that he ultimately yearns for the 
lockstep days: 
 
If there is one other matter upon which the majority and the Chief 
Justice are in accord, it is in their dissatisfaction with federal First 
Amendment jurisprudence. I am far less troubled by it. In fact, I have 
come away from this appeal with a newfound sympathy for it. The 
attraction of the federal First Amendment approach may have more to do 
with my unease over the alternatives proposed by my colleagues . . . . I 
have, therefore, come to be convinced that there is merit in the federal 
“intermediate scrutiny” model and that we should incorporate it into our 
analytical approach to the regulation of free expression under the Utah 
Constitution.137 
 
It has also been posited that Justice Nehring has a more interstitial approach to 
constitutional interpretation.138  
The tools presented in American Bush are malleable. The sheer volume of 
approaches in the opinion substantiates the claim that a simple footnote to a plain 
meaning argument is not what the court is requesting. With this collection of 
interpretational tools, none is particularly essential to success. What will get the 
attention of the court is an argument using as many of these tools as possible.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In the current era of Utah constitutional case law, the legal community will 
have to be creative—and even deviceful—to piece together compelling briefs to 
argue cases under the Utah Constitution. In contrast to the early days of New 
Judicial Federalism where the court introduced new interpretations into the Utah 
constitutional dialogue from nothing more than a party’s citation to sister state law, 
sophisticated briefing is now necessary to succeed on a Utah Constitutional claim. 
Even where there is little case law or unfavorable prior precedents, practitioners 
may still find success by raising arguments grounded in the text of the Utah 
Constitution and supported by those sources the court has identified as useful for 
interpreting its text. The strongest textual arguments will be those supported by 
historical evidence of the intent of the 1895 Utah voters and drafters of the Utah 
Constitution, analysis of the constitutional traditions of sister states, and the history 
of the society that adopted the Utah Constitution. 
                                                        
137 Id.  
138 See Furse, supra note 80, at 1655 (citing Utah v. Robinson, 254 P.3d 183, 186 n.14 
(Utah 2011)).  
